



Evolutionary or Revolutionary Business Model  
Innovation through Coopetition?  





Institute for Manufacturing 
Department of Engineering 
University of Cambridge 
17 Charles Babbage Road 
Cambridge CB3 0FS 
United Kingdom 
email: c.velu@eng.cam.ac.uk 
Tel: +44 (0)1223 765 879 






Acknowledgements: This study was supported by funding from the Economic and Social 
Research Council. I am grateful to Rajesh Chandy, Jan Heide, Sriya Iyer, Jaideep Prabhu and Eden 
Yin for helpful comments. I would also like to thank the Editors and the anonymous reviewers for 









Evolutionary or Revolutionary Business Model 
Innovation through Coopetition?  
The Role of Dominance in Network Markets 
Abstract  
This paper examines how the level of dominance in firms affects when they engage in coopetition 
in order to innovate their business model. We present a longitudinal and in-depth single case study 
of the business model innovation decisions of investment banks in the US corporate bond trading 
market. We find that, in network markets, when firms choose to engage in coopetition in light of 
competitive threat it is done so in order to adopt a defensive or offensive strategy. The study shows 
that in network markets the less dominant firms tend to engage in coopetition to innovate their 
business model in an evolutionary manner before the dominant firms, as a defensive strategy to 
protect their existing business model. In contrast, the dominant firms tend to engage in coopetition 
to innovate their business model in a revolutionary manner after the less dominant firms, as an 
offensive strategy to alter radically their existing business model. We draw implications of 











Firms are increasingly cooperating and competing at the same time in order to create and 
capture value (Bouncken & Kraus, 2013; Ritala, Golnam, & Wegmann, 2014; Rusko, 2014). 
Shorter product lifecycle, convergence of multiple technologies and increasing costs of conducting 
R&D require firms to have multiple resources to improve continuously on delivering the existing 
value proposition, while exploring new opportunities to foster innovation (Gassmann, 2006; 
Gnyawali & Park, 2011). Such multiple resources often do not reside within a single firm and, 
hence, firms in the same industry often cooperate in order to share such resources and then compete 
to divide the created value jointly. Such collaborative activity has been termed coopetition (see 
Bengtsson & Kock, 2014; Yami, Castaldo, Dagnino, & Le Roy, 2010). Recent research has 
highlighted the importance of understanding how organizations can affect the mechanism of value 
creation and capture in a coopetition context using the concept of business models (Ritala, Golnam, 
& Wegmann, 2014). However, research in this area has not explored when and how firms in an 
industry might decide with their competitors to adopt a coopetition strategy in order to innovate 
their business models. This study aims to explore the incentive for incumbent firms of various 
sizes to innovate their business model over time by adopting a coopetition-based strategy. 
Studies on strategic management have focused primarily on inter-firm competition to create 
competitive advantage (Brandenburger & Nalebuff, 1996; Gnyawali, He, & Madhavan, 2008). 
Competition and cooperation have been considered separate modes of firm interaction (Chen, 
2008; Tidström, 2014). However, more recently scholars have been placing emphasis on studies 
that examine firms simultaneously engaging in cooperation and competition (see Bengtsson & 
Kock, 2014; Ritala & Hurmelinna-Laukkanen, 2013). Such studies have examined the motivations 
for coopetition as a need to innovate in order to gain and sustain competitive advantage (Ritala, 
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2012). A recent study has also emphasized the emergent as opposed to the planned mode in inter-
organizational relationships in that coopetition might emerge as unplanned competition within 
firms that are cooperating (Czakon 2010). Studies have shown that coopetition can enhance the 
innovativeness of firms (Belderbos, Carree, & Lokshin, 2004; Quintana-Garcı´a & Benavides-
Velasco, 2004; Tether, 2002), but it is moderated by the degree of competition (see Park, Srivstava, 
& Gnyawali 2014; Ritala, 2012). These studies have focused predominantly on the influence of 
coopetition on product innovations. However, recent studies have emphasized that business-model 
innovation takes place when a firm adopts a new approach to commercializing its assets and could 
be a source of innovation activities (Ehret, Kashyap and Wirtz 2010; Mason and Spring 2010).   
A business model summarizes the architecture and logic of a business (Baden-Fuller & 
Morgan, 2010) – it defines the organization’s value proposition and its approach to value creation 
and value capture (Teece, 2010). Therefore, business model innovation involves the adoption of 
fundamentally different modes of value proposition, value creation and/or capture (Markides, 
2006). Business model innovation can redefine what a product or service is, how it is provided to 
the customer, and the means to monetize the customer value proposition. The degree of business 
model innovation can be either incremental or radical (Velu, 2015). Incremental business model 
innovation is when there are minor changes to the value proposition, value creation and approach 
to value capture with respect to the existing business model, while radical business model 
innovation involves major changes to these elements. Moreover, the degree of business model 
innovation needs to be studied by transcending the firm boundary and examining how partner firms 
with complementary resources might influence its outcome (Berglund & Sandtrom, 2013; Zott and 
Amit 2008). The intensity of competition in an industry could affect the need for sharing such 
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resources, which in turn could affect the incentive to cooperate among competing firms and 
influence the degree of business model innovation.  
One of the key resources for a firm is the installed customer base. The dominance of the 
firm, often measured in terms of market share, captures the resource in terms of the installed 
customer base. The dynamics of how the installed customer base changes are particularly 
important in network markets, which are subject to externalities in demand, whereby the utility to 
each customer of adopting a firm’s proposition increases with an increase in the total number of 
customers who have adopted the proposition (Farrell & Saloner, 1986; Katz & Shapiro, 1985). 
Therefore, the resulting customer adoption dynamics1 in network markets will influence how and 
when firms engage in coopetition. This is because as customers dis-adopt an existing product or 
service proposition in order to adopt a new proposition provided by a new entrant, the resource 
base of the incumbent firms diminishes. Such diminishing resource base of the incumbent firms 
might incentivise them to cooperate with their competitors. Such cooperation with competitors 
enables incumbents firms to regain market share in order help innovate their business models as a 
means to retain their leadership position in the industry. The research question we pose in this 
paper is as follows: ‘How does the level of dominance of incumbent firms affect when they engage 
in coopetition and how they would innovate their business models in doing so?’  
We present a longitudinal and in-depth single case study (based on 60 interviews with senior 
management) of the business model innovation decisions of investment banks in the US corporate 
bond trading market, a huge industry with trading volumes exceeding $US400 billion per day. 
Despite its importance, this industry has rarely been studied from an innovation perspective (Frame 
& White, 2004). We find that, in network markets, when firms choose to engage in coopetition in 
                                                 
1 The customer adoption dynamics describes when customers adopt or dis-adopt a product or service proposition. 
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light of competitive threat it is done so in order to adopt a defensive or offensive strategy. We show 
that, in network markets, the less dominant firms tend to engage in coopetition to innovate their 
business model in an evolutionary manner before the dominant firms, as a defensive strategy to 
protect their existing business model. On the other hand, the dominant firms tend to engage in 
coopetition to innovate their business model in a revolutionary manner after the less dominant 
firms, as an offensive strategy to alter radically their existing business model. In doing so, we make 
two contributions to the literature. First, we contribute to the coopetition literature by showing that 
one of the mechanisms, namely the customer base, can act to influence the interplay between 
competition and cooperation in order for firms to engage in coopetition. Second, we contribute to 
the business model literature by showing how the resource base, namely the installed customer 
base, drives firms to engage in coopetition in order to innovate the business model in an 
evolutionary or revolutionary manner. 
The next section reviews the relevant literature. Section 3 describes the data and method 
adopted for the case study, and Section 4 uses the empirical evidence to extend the theory on 
coopetition. Section 5 discusses the managerial and theoretical implications, and Section 6 
concludes.  
2. Literature Review 
2.1 Coopetition 
Coopetition is seen as a paradoxical relationship whereby firms compete and cooperate at 
the same time (Bengtsson & Kock, 2014). Coopetition could exist between either two firms or 
many firms simultaneously. Researchers have examined coopetition by examining when a ‘win-
win’ relationship could come about by balancing value creation and value capture. Brandenburger 
and Nalebuff (1995, 1996) use concepts from game theory to articulate how coopetition could 
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enhance value for firms. The authors do so by examining how other firms in the network could 
acts as complementors or competitors to a focal incumbent firm depending on their respective roles 
(Brandenburger and Nalebuff, 1995, 1996). They show how firms might cooperate to create a new 
product and then compete to get a share of the market in order to distribute the returns from the 
value that has been created. Such coopetition often requires the management of tension between 
cooperation and competition (Tidström, 2014); several factors are important for balancing such 
tension. These include leadership, organizational design and relationship-specific trust (Chin, 
Chan, & Lam, 2008; Lacoste, 2012). Some scholars have examined coopetition from the network 
perspective, such as learning and knowledge-sharing (Powell, Koput, & Smith-Doerr, 1996; 
Gnyawali & Madhavan, 2001). Other scholars have explored such balancing of value creation and 
capture by examining the resource-based view of sharing technologies and resources (Chen, 1996; 
Emden, Calantone, & Droge, 2006). Studies have argued that the main motivations for coopetition 
are access to resources in order to create competitive advantage from existing business or for 
growth through innovation (Bengtsson & Kock, 2014; Raza-Ullah, Bengtsson, & Kock, 2014).  
Competitive advantage has been discussed from the perspective of examining the position 
of the firm and the characteristics of the network (Gnyawali & Madhavan, 2001). Such a network-
centric approach allows firms to obtain better information, resources and status and to facilitate 
learning, which could stimulate knowledge-sharing, market expansion and technological progress 
(Dahl, 2014; Bengtsson, Eriksson, & Wincent, 2010). Studies have argued that competitive 
advantage could manifest itself in the form of strategic flexibility as a result of coopetition 
(Bengtsson et al., 2010). The role of firms within a business network has been shown to be a key 
enabler of coopetition (Bengtsson and Kock 1999; 2000). In particular, coopetition will be more 
prevalent in the case where there are heterogeneity in terms of the resources of the firms 
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(Bengtsson and Kock 2000). However, the degree of coopetition might differ according to the 
position in the value chain whereby competition might be more prevalent in activities closer to the 
customer or downstream activities whereas cooperation might be stronger in the activities further 
away from the customer or upstream activities (Bengtsson and Kock 2000).  
Studies have also shown that competition and cooperation are influenced by industry 
structure in network markets, which are markets that display network externalities in which the 
addition of a new customer adds value to other customers (Katz & Shapiro, 1985). In network 
markets the utility of each customer is an increasing function of the number of other customers in 
the market (Katz & Shapiro, 1985). In such markets the addition of a new customer adds value for 
others. The externalities derived by customers in network markets as a result of other customers 
are called demand-side externalities. Studies have shown that the likelihood of coopetition among 
incumbent firms increases with market concentration and greater customer penetration, and 
diminishes with time (Fjeldstad, Becerra, & Narayanan, 2004). In particular, the objective is to 
avoid competitive retaliation when market concentration is high, the incentive to increase 
transaction volume among existing customers when customer penetration is high or the desire to 
cooperate among competitors could be driven by the need to compete to create standards early in 
the industry’s evolution  (Gwynne, 2009; Spiegel, 2005). 
Coopetition as a means to foster innovation is becoming increasingly common as a result of 
shorter product lifecycle, convergence of multiple technologies (e.g. telecommunications, 
computers and television) and increasing costs of conducting R&D (Gnyawali & Park, 2011). 
Increasing product lifecycle due to rapid changes in customer preferences and technological 
obsolescence provides an incentive for firms to cooperate as well as compete (Gassmann, 2006). 
Moreover, convergence of multiple technologies provides incentives for firms to manage risks 
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while leveraging opportunities through coopetition (Garud, 1994). In addition, when technologies 
converge, coopetition provides opportunities to shape the institutions and standards (Gomes-
Casseres, 1994). High R&D costs also provide incentives for firms to combine R&D resources in 
order to share the process of creation, acquisition and knowledge-sharing (Zineldin, 2004).  
In general, inter-firm relationships are driven by the desire to integrate supplementary and 
complementary resources in order to create and capture more value than would be possible if the 
firms were to do so independently. However, in a coopetition context the sharing of resources is 
even more complex compared to other inter-firm relationships because the same resource could be 
used to create value for both competition and cooperation (Ritala, Golnam, & Wegmann, 2014). 
Moreover, the value capture potentially takes place in the same market or industry. Therefore, 
understanding the rationale for the business model – the mechanism by which value is created and 
captured – is particularly important in the context of coopetition. The rationale for coopetition-
based business models in this context could be to increase the size of the current market, create 
new markets, increase efficiency in resource utilization and improving the firms’ competitive 
position (Ritala, Golnam, & Wegmann, 2014). However, extant studies have not explored how 
changes in resources as a result of competition might influence the incentive to engage in 
coopetition in order to innovate the business model. We next review the literature on business 
models and innovation in order to explore this issue further. 
2.2 Business Model Innovation and Firm Dominance 
The business model is a structural template that describes the system of interdependent 
activities transcending the focal firm and spanning its boundaries in order to create and capture 
value (Zott & Amit, 2001) – it is the realized strategy of the firm and is a combination of 
complementary resources that support the commercialization of core products (Vidal & Mitchell, 
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2013). It follows that business model innovation involves a more systemic change than product or 
process innovation because it involves changes to the customer value proposition, value creation 
and capture (Markides, 2006; Velu & Stiles, 2013). Therefore, one needs to study how 
transcending the firm boundary and sharing resources helps firm to innovate their business model. 
The calculus of how and when to engage in coopetition in order to implement a business model 
innovation varies depending on whether the incumbent firm in question is dominant – in other 
words, has a large market share and hence customers as resources in the traditional business – or 
less dominant. 
Scholars in the management of technology argue that established dominant firms are slow 
to respond to radical innovation, primarily as a result of issues related to competence (Henderson, 
2006; Henderson & Clark, 1990; Tushman & Anderson, 1986). In essence, when a technological 
change destroys competence, the disruption renders the capabilities of the established firm 
obsolete. Therefore, in the presence of organizational inertia the dominant established firm might 
not be able to reconfigure its resources to take advantage of the new technology and, hence, might 
be slow to adopt the innovation. The capabilities that make firms market leaders might 
subsequently act as competency traps, whereby the established routines make it extremely difficult 
for the firm to change its mode of operation (Leonard-Barton, 1992). 
On the other hand, Christensen and Bower (1996) argue that the inability of leaders to 
innovate radically is a result not of a lack of competence but rather of cognition failures in the 
senior management team, resulting from resource dependency and the resource allocation 
procedure. Leading firms often place an emphasis on allocating resources to their most demanding 
larger customers in order to improve the focal mainstream performance of existing technologies. 
The practice of allocating resources to improving existing technologies prevents such leaders from 
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investing in new, potentially disruptive technologies. Christensen and Bower (1996) show how 
dominant firms in the disk drive industry lost their leadership position following each generation 
of new technology as a result of such a resource-dependent investment programme. A recent study 
has also shown how changing behavioral norms in an industry can play a role whereby leadership 
position of the incumbent firm can be overturned by entrants to an industry by subverting the 
cooperative norms in the sector (Le Roy and Guillotreau 2010). 
Scholars have also argued, from as early as Schumpeter (1942), that the most likely factor 
influencing dominance and innovation is the availability of slack resources, including money, 
people and facilities (Hage, 1980). This resource constraint hypothesis argues that the lack of slack 
resources might inhibit firms from adopting radical innovation. The effect of the resource 
constraint hypothesis could work favourably for dominant firms. Arguably, dominant firms are 
more innovative because they have more resources to invest in research and a greater ability to 
hire skilled workers and also maintain technical facilities (Hitt, Hoskinson, & Ireland, 1990; Singh, 
1990). Moreover, using the resource-based view, scholars have also argued that dominant 
incumbent firms have an advantage over smaller firms or new entrants because they possess 
complementary assets that are less dependent on specific inventions (Teece, 1986; Rothaermel, 
2001). Complementary assets, which include large customer base, brand, reputation and 
distribution capabilities, might give dominant firms an advantage over their smaller rivals in 
innovation (Ofek & Sarvary, 2003). In contrast, complementary assets, such as the installed 
customer base, can result in investment inertia due to the fear of cannibalization, resulting in a 
lower incentive to innovate among dominant incumbent firms (Ghemawat, 1991). 
Although – using the resource-based view – scholars have argued that complementary assets 
such as large customer base could affect the incentive to innovate, the extant literature does not 
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examine how customer adoption dynamics affect how and when incumbent firms cooperate in 
order to innovate their business models. Customer adoption dynamics are particularly important 
in network markets. The presence of demand-side externalities in network markets influences 
customers to adopt an offering based on a particular business model because other customers have 
adopted it (Katz & Shapiro, 1985; Gladwell, 2000). Adoption would be slow initially but accelerate 
as more customers adopted and, hence, the utility from adoption increased. The adoption rate 
would then slow down as the market reached saturation. In this formulation of customer adoption, 
an S-shaped curve is obtained (Young, 2009; Griliches, 1957).2 Although many studies have 
looked at the S-curve as a result of customer adoption behaviour, little has been said about the 
shape of customer attrition (Mahajan & Wind, 1986; Stoneman & Battisti, 2000; Stoneman & 
Karshenas, 1995). As customer utility in network markets is dependent on how many other 
customers are in the market, a similar argument could hold for customer attrition. In the case of 
customer attrition the rate at which customers leave a particular business model depends on how 
many others continue to use it. As before, customer attrition is initially slow but accelerates and 
tails off as most customers leave, giving rise to a reverse S-curve. 
The decisions about how and when to innovate the business model are especially challenging 
in network markets (Bonaccorsi, Giannangeli, & Rossi, 2006). An important effect of demand 
externalities in network markets is that the calculus of how and when to engage in coopetition in 
order to implement an innovation varies depending on whether the incumbent firm in question is 
dominant or less dominant. Dominant incumbents have more to lose by implementing an 
innovation because they face the prospect of losing the substantial profits they derive from the 
                                                 
2 The technology management literature also explains the concept of S-curves in the take-up of new technologies, 
but does not invoke the notion of network externalities. The S-curve is driven by the increased benefits of the new 
technology over time (Foster, 1986; Utterback, 1994). 
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existing business model, product or service proposition. Firms that adopt a coopetition strategy are 
arguably either more or less incentivized to innovate their business model. On the one hand, it has 
been argued that firms in the same industry might have similar assets and, hence, any innovation 
to the business model will be incremental in nature. On the other hand, one can argue that the 
sharing of resources among competing firms enables more resources that would enable radical 
business model innovation. We next examine a case study in the financial services industry in 
order to explore this issue further. 
3. Method and Empirical Context 
Our empirical analysis is based on detailed interviews with managers and analyses of 
archival material. We study business model innovations in the US bond market between the years 
1995 and 2000. The US bond market represents the largest securities market in the world, with 
over $17 trillion in bonds outstanding as at the end of 2000. The bond market consists of the 
primary and secondary markets. In the primary market government agencies and corporations issue 
securities to raise funds. In the secondary market, institutional investors (such as asset management 
firms and pension funds) buy and sell these securities. The business model innovations in the US 
bond market displayed three characteristics that offered a particularly suitable setting for an in-
depth case study of the central research question, for several reasons. First, the banks engaged in 
coopetition in order to innovate their business models; second, the US bond market was an industry 
in which a traditional business model existed with the potential to be transformed into different 
types of business model; third, the bond markets displayed significant network effects,3 which 
influenced one of the key resources, namely, the size of the installed customer base; and, the 
                                                 
3 This is because as the liquidity (total number of transactions) increases, the ability for a buyer (seller) to execute a 
trade in a timely manner at a fair price increases as a result of the increase in the probability of finding sellers (buyers) 




incumbent banks displayed different degrees of market dominance.  
3.1. Data Collection 
Our data about the bank’s innovation decisions came from both semi-structured interviews 
and secondary data sources. We followed the method of ‘purposeful sampling’ in choosing our 
interviewees. We initially contacted informants at a number of the banks involved in forming the 
consortiums, whom we believed would be the most knowledgeable to inform us about our research 
question about coopetition. Following this, we then asked each interviewee for recommendations 
about who could best provide further detail on our question of interest. We followed this approach 
to create an ongoing sample of interviewees, focusing our data collection on emerging themes until 
further interviews yielded no significant new information. To maintain consistency, the author 
conducted all interviews and managed the data collection meticulously to ensure its 
trustworthiness, writing up notes within 24 hours to ensure reliability. 
We interviewed 60 key senior executives across the banks that were affected by, or directly 
influenced, the formation of the cooperative consortiums (as summarized in Table 1). The 
executives were from various divisions, including strategy, sales and trading, human resources, 
information technology and finance. The interviews took place during three visits to New York in 
2003, 2004 and 2005; they were semi-structured (interviewees were provided with a list of 
questions beforehand but were not constrained by them during the interviews) and examined the 
decisions associated with forming the consortiums. Most of the interviews lasted between 60 and 
90 minutes and, while they were not recorded for confidentiality reasons, the interviewer took 
extensive notes following the interviews, which were then typed up immediately. The interviews 
covered areas such as the history and background of electronic trading, innovation in the industry, 
competition and the forming of the consortiums across the firms in the industry. The interviews 
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covered these areas whilst emphasizing the aspects where the interviewees had particular expertise 
based on the division they were from as outlined in Table 1. The approach enabled triangulation 
of the information collected from the interviews in order to provide more focused exploration of 
the issues. 
Table 1 about here. 
We followed a qualitative case-study approach, as answering the research question required 
a rich, process-orientated analysis (Yin, 2003). In conducting our research we were aware of the 
possible disadvantages associated with this method, as retrospective bias and an ‘official firm line’ 
might be present. In order to overcome some of these shortcomings, we interviewed several 
executives from each department in order to cross-check the validity of the evidence being 
provided by the interviewees. In addition, we asked the interviewees to provide contact details for 
other relevant individuals within and across firms. We then interviewed these other executives in 
order to confirm earlier interview evidence or provide alternative perspectives. In addition, we 
further corroborated our interview data from archival and other secondary material available on 
the topic (press reports, for example, Factiva; financial databases, for example, Thomson 
Financial; and industry reports, for example, Bond Markets Association reports). In order to ensure 
reliability of our data, we carefully cross-checked any interview data with news reports, industry 
newsletters and annual reports of the firms, where possible. We did not find any significant 
discrepancies between our interview data and these independent sources. Moreover, we also 
interviewed three officers from industry associations and two partners of strategy consulting firms 
who were familiar with the bond markets, to corroborate further the data. We used a combination 




3.2. Data Analysis 
The data analysis for the case study consisted of three stages: 
(i) The case study data was coded based on the theoretical classification developed around 
coopetition as our initial analysis framework. 
(ii) Our initial concepts were refined and iterated between emerging categories and the 
literature on dominance, innovation and business models with coopetition in order to revise 
continuously our analysis framework. 
(iii) We confirmed and refined the mapping of evidence to the revised framework through 
discussion between the interviewing author and two other researchers. 
We followed a number of steps when coding and analysing our data. First, we started the 
data analysis using open coding to identify initial concepts, which we then grouped into categories 
(Van Maanen, 1979). Second, we examined and searched for relationships between and across 
these categories to gather them into higher-order themes, and then grouped similar themes into 
several overarching dimensions to help develop some of the key constructs for our framework on 
coopetition, dominance and innovation (Strauss & Corbin, 1998). Third, where possible, we used 
secondary source material to triangulate our data to increase its reliability via a recursive process, 
which was repeated until no new relationships were revealed. Following such an approach, we 
were able to develop themes that formed our first-order concepts. The fourth analysis stage 
involved refining our first-order concepts by iterating between emerging categories and the 
coopetition literature. Attempts to map the evidence pointed to the dominance, innovation and 
business model literature as a basis for refining our framework to map our second-order themes, 
resulting in the identification of dominance and timing concepts. In the fifth analysis stage, we 
used peer debriefing, which involved the field researcher discussing with researchers who were 
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not directly involved in the fieldwork in order to obtain an independent, outside view of the themes, 
also enabling us to consider and eliminate possible alternative explanations. 
Figure 1 about here. 
We present our data structure in Figure 1 by highlighting the first-order concepts, second-
order themes and aggregate dimensions from which we developed our model. We also provide 
additional selected quotations supporting our interpretation of the data in the Appendix in line with 
the recommendation for data reporting from recent studies (see Pratt, 2009). 
4. Findings 
4.1. The US Bond Market Following the Advent of the Internet 
The trading of bonds has traditionally been done via dealer banks that act as intermediaries. 
In 1995 buyers and sellers often obtained quotes from multiple dealers almost exclusively via a 
telephone-based system (see Figure 2). Dealer banks in turn generated revenues from the bid-ask 
spread between the buy and sell prices. The dealers often had to buy securities and hold them in 
inventory before being able to sell them to another investor. The dealer assumed the risk of price 
fluctuations, which required economic risk capital. 
(Figure 2 about here) 
The process of matching buyers and sellers via the telephone is relatively slow and 
inefficient, as buyers and sellers cannot view the full liquidity (total number of buy and sell orders 
for the various securities in the market) of the market in a transparent manner. The advent of 
Internet technology enabled two new business models to emerge. The first was an evolutionary 
business model. This business model innovation (as shown on the left of Figure 3) maintains the 
traditional business model, whereby buyers and sellers transact via an intermediary bank; however, 
the process migrates to an electronic platform where prices are posted directly by dealers. The 
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value proposition is essentially the same as the traditional business model, whereby the price and 
quality elements are marginally altered. Specifically, the business model involves marginal 
changes to the price, because the electronic platform permits easier price comparison through the 
instantaneous availability of information across dealers. The evolutionary business model also 
involves marginal changes to other elements of the value proposition. Specifically, it involves 
minor changes to the product (from telephone to e-trading platform), distribution (buyers and 
sellers still trade through a dealer bank acting as an intermediary, but it occurs over the electronic 
platform rather than via telephone), and promotion (which remains active and dealer-led, but 
occurs over the electronic platform rather than via telephone). Therefore, the approach to value 
creation is substantially the same, whereby the banks still act as intermediaries between buyers 
and sellers. Moreover, because the dealers continue to generate revenues from the bid-ask spread, 
the capital commitment and the corresponding cost of this business model are similar to that of the 
traditional telephone-based trading model. 
(Figure 3 here) 
The second business model innovation (as shown on the right of Figure 3) entails a 
revolutionary change to the traditional business model, whereby buyers and sellers execute trades 
directly among themselves on an electronic platform. In this model, the role of the intermediary 
bank as dealer becomes obsolete. The value proposition is substantially different, as buyers and 
sellers transact directly with one another. Specifically, the business model involves a major change 
to the price, from being based on the spread to being based on a transaction fee. The revolutionary 
business model innovation also involves substantial changes to other elements of the value 
proposition. Specifically, it involves major changes to the product (from telephone to e-trading 
directly between investors), distribution (from dealers acting as intermediary to direct trading 
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between buyers and sellers, which enables a more transparent, comprehensive and unfiltered view 
of the market place), and promotion (from being actively dealer-led to being passively buyer-
initiated information-gathering on the e-platform). Therefore, the approach to value creation is 
substantially different, whereby the banks do not act as intermediaries but enable direct trading 
between buyers and sellers. Finally, the cost structure changes, as the banks can reduce the amount 
of economic risk capital set aside for market-making compared to the traditional business model, 
as their role as market-making intermediaries becomes redundant. 
4.2. Market Dominance in the Corporate Bond Market 
In this section we describe the major firms and their relative dominance in the US corporate 
bond market in the period 1995–2000. The corporate bond market was highly concentrated. We 
use the underwriting league table based on the primary market as a proxy for market concentration 
and dominance.4 During the five years from 1995 to 1999, the top ten dealer banks underwrote 
approximately 94 to 98 per cent of corporate new issues (as shown on the left of Figure 4). The 
four dominant banks (Bank 1, Bank 2, Bank 3 and Bank 4) grouped together to form one 
consortium while the less dominant banks formed another. For the purpose of implementation of 
the business model innovations leveraging the Internet, these banks engaged in coopetition to form 
two consortiums – one dominant and the other less so. We next describe how the less dominant 
and dominant firms respectively responded to a new entrant. 
(Figure 4 about here) 
                                                 
4 Underwriting is the process by which banks agree either to distribute or buy a particular amount of a new issue of 
bonds for a fee. Dealer banks are not required to – and do not – report secondary trading market shares. Consequently, 
there is no publicly available syndicated source or database upon which we can draw for this information. However, 
our interviews with senior bankers in the bond divisions of the major investment banks confirmed that the primary 
issue underwriting league tables provide a good proxy for dealers' shares of the secondary trading market. This is 
because the process of underwriting primary issues gives banks leverage over, and privileged access to, investors in 





4.3. Response of the Less Dominant Firms 
A new entrant called NewTrade5 took advantage of the Internet to launch a revolutionary 
business model (right of Figure 3). NewTrade announced the launch of RevolTrade to trade high-
yield corporate bonds (in 1998) and opened for trading in 1999 to allow investors to trade directly 
with one another. We now look at how the incumbent banks responded to the new entrant to 
address the question of how and when incumbents engage in coopetition in order to implement 
business model innovations. 
Initially, both the dominant and less dominant banks merely noted the emergence of a new 
entrant with a radically different business model. This was encapsulated in an interview with an 
executive from one of the incumbent banks:  
Initially we did not think that RevolTrade was a major threat to us as it was a radically new 
business model and had to build up customers in order to be credible. This was difficult in a 
market where customers want a market that is liquid in order to ensure that they are able to buy 
and sell when they want. 
As a result the banks did not respond to the launch of RevolTrade. However, after a few 
months of trading, the less dominant incumbent banks were beginning to lose customers to 
RevolTrade, at a faster rate than the dominant banks. This was noted by an executive from one of 
the less dominant banks: 
Following a few months of their launch, RevolTrade was beginning to pick up some of our trades 
partly because they were able to offer superior prices given their low capital based trading model 
that enabled direct trading between buyers and sellers. We were finding it increasingly difficult to 
retain these customer orders as we did not have the liquidity of the large banks and could not match 
                                                 
5 The names of the firm and all trading platform business models have been changed. 
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the pricing of the new entrant, RevolTrade, either. It was increasingly becoming clear that we needed 
to respond to the threat posed by RevolTrade. 
In January 2000, in response to the new entrant, the less dominant incumbents, Bank 6, Bank 
8 and Bank 9, announced the launch of the Begonia consortium for trading corporate bonds. 
Begonia was conceived at Bank 9. The objective of Begonia was to maintain the current business 
model, whereby investors could still buy and sell securities via an intermediary dealer but migrate 
this to an electronic medium. Begonia was therefore an evolutionary business model compared to 
the traditional business model, as it involved marginal changes to the value proposition, value 
creation and approach to value capture (as shown on the left of Figure 3). This was evident from a 
statement taken from one of the interviews: ‘Begonia will be a comprehensive multi-dealer 
transaction platform on the Internet that will maintain the existing approach to trading but move 
it to an electronic interface.’ The less dominant banks were of the view that an evolutionary 
business model innovation would help stem the loss of customers from their existing business 
model. This was articulated very neatly by one of the executives from the founding bank for 
Begonia: 
We needed to reduce our costs of the telephone based trading model. Hence, we decided to migrate 
the trading of bonds to an electronic platform in order to do so. We strongly believed that if we 
reduced the cost whilst still providing the customer the benefit of acting as an intermediary dealer, 
we would be able to defend our franchise. However, we need to have a larger market share in order 
to be able to be competitive against the large banks. We knew that the large banks would not be 
interested to join the consortium as they already had a large market share and can defend themselves 
against any loss of market to RevolTrade. Therefore, we decided to ask a number of the smaller banks 
to join the Begonia consortium.  
In addition, the potential market share loss – as a result of the strong network effects due to 
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the smaller market shares of the less dominant banks – was encapsulated in the following statement 
made by a senior executive at one of the less dominant banks:  
We were a small bank relative to other large banks in the market and we were in danger of losing 
our customers very rapidly to the new entrant, RevolTrade. This is because the market trades where 
there is liquidity and we were consciously aware that once we start losing market share there is likely 
to be a fast avalanche away from our trading floors to the other avenue. Therefore, we needed to 
join the Begonia consortium because the fear of losing our customer franchise drove our investment 
decision. 
Hence, Bank 6 and Bank 8 joined Bank 9 as founding partners. Soon after, in 2000, Bank 10 
and Bank 12 also joined the Begonia consortium. The combined average market share of these less 
dominant banks in the corporate bond market over the five-year period from 1995 to 1999 was 
19.4 per cent (see right of Figure 4). The response of the less dominant banks in launching Begonia, 
an evolutionary business model, was aimed at protecting the traditional business model. Therefore, 
we propose: 
Proposition 1: In network markets the less dominant firms tend to engage in coopetition to 
innovate their business model in an evolutionary manner before the dominant firms, as a defensive 
strategy to protect their existing business model. 
We next discuss the response of the dominant firm. 
4.4. Response of Dominant Firms 
 As discussed earlier, the dominant banks initially did not respond to the launch of 
RevolTrade. This is because the dominant banks had the largest market shares and, hence, had 
effective control of liquidity in the market. After a few months, following the launch of 
RevolTrade, the dominant banks lost some market share to RevolTrade; however, they did not see 
this as a major threat. This was articulated by a senior executive at one of the dominant banks: 
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Although we were losing some trades to RevolTrade, we considered these to be marginal. We still 
held most of the market and provided liquidity to our customer base. Hence, although RevolTrade 
was offering lower commissions to trade, we beat them more often on the basis of our superior 
liquidity and being able to execute the trades in a timely manner at a fair price. 
However, the stance taken by the dominant banks changed dramatically following the launch 
of the evolutionary business model, Begonia, by the less dominant banks. This was a result of the 
acceleration in the loss of market share due to network effects, which was encapsulated by an 
executive from one of the dominant banks: 
The launch of the Begonia business model was a timely reminder for us that doing nothing was not 
an option any longer. We were beginning to see an erosion of our market share not only to the new 
entrant, RevolTrade, but also to the business model consortium formed by other incumbent banks, 
Begonia. Although initially we were not seeing any major loss of trades due to us being the liquidity 
holders, this position was becoming increasingly untenable as customers were switching to the other 
two avenues with increasing alacrity. Our traders were finding it increasingly difficult to retain some 
of the key trades and we could see ourselves losing our competitiveness. 
The desire of the dominant banks not to be followers or to invest in the evolutionary business 
model was clearly encapsulated in the words of a senior executive from one of the dominant banks:  
We did not want to accelerate the margin compression that a multi-dealer electronic platform such 
as Begonia would have caused.6 Accelerating margin compression will reduce revenues from spread 
based commissions and hence, hit our bottom line very quickly as we had very high costs from 
operating in the business in the form of trading capital as well as other fixed costs.  
However, the dominant banks needed to react to the evolutionary business model put forward 
                                                 
6 ‘Accelerate the margin compression’ refers to the speed of reduction in the spread. The evolutionary business model 
would have caused a decline in the spread without corresponding reduction in capital, which would have caused a 




by the less dominant banks, as this was increasingly likely to affect their market shares. 
Accordingly, one of the executives said: ‘We needed to change the metrics of competition in the 
market. We felt that we needed to change the game to continue to be leaders as the existing 
intermediary based business model was no longer viable.’ 
The dominant dealers in the corporate bond market, namely, Bank 1, Bank 2, Bank 3 and 
Bank 4 (as shown on the right of Figure 4), were not part of the Begonia consortium. However, 
they needed to respond strategically to the new entrant and the Begonia consortium. Driven by the 
new developments in the market, the secondary trading business was becoming relatively less 
profitable for the four most dominant dealers. The reason for this was articulated by one of the 
executives interviewed: 
As we were one of the largest banks in the corporate bond trading market, we needed to hold a 
significant amount of capital in order to buy and hold inventory. However, when we started losing 
market shares to the newcomer and consortium formed by the smaller banks, the economics of scale 
started to work against us. We very quickly went from a position of being extremely profitable to one 
where bond trading was seen as a weak step-sister and increasingly less profitable for us. 
The dominant banks lost some market share and the business looked decidedly unprofitable 
and less attractive. This was because of large fixed costs; the usual benefits of scale economics 
were working against the dominant banks much faster than they were against the less dominant 
banks with commensurately lower fixed costs. The dominant dealers saw an opportunity to reduce 
the capital commitment to a relatively less profitable business by facilitating direct dealing 
between investors. This was a revolutionary change to the existing bond trading business model. 
The revenue architecture of the new business model was substantially different from the 
established business model of market-making for the dealers. The dealers no longer had to commit 
to making markets in the securities but could provide the risk capital required to guarantee the 
25 
 
credit risk of the transaction. Moreover, the founding partners could generate a fee from each 
transaction. If the new business model were successful it could make the initial business model 
obsolete. The idea was conceptualized within Bank 1. However, Bank 1, with approximately 17.5 
per cent of the market share, felt that it did not have sufficient liquidity on its own to make this a 
success. Bank 1 approached Bank 2 and Bank 3 to join the consortium. The three dominant players 
between them had more than 46 per cent of the market share (see right of Figure 4). The benefits 
of competitor banks joining forces were articulated by a senior executive of one of the dominant 
banks:   
Although we were competitors, we believed that by joining forces we could leverage the size of our 
installed customer base and alter the probability of success substantially for ourselves. Moreover, 
we felt that if we did not join the consortium, we could be locked out of the market and other large 
banks might be invited to join the consortium instead. 
An announcement was made by Banks 1, 2 and 3 respectively in 2001 about the launch of 
Orchid, with its revolutionary business model. Orchid was launched to trade investment-grade 
corporate bonds in the first instance, followed by high-grade corporate bonds and municipal bonds. 
Immediately following the announcement of the launch of Orchid, Bank 4 was invited to join the 
consortium. Bank 4 effectively became the fourth founding partner of Orchid later in 2000 by 
taking an equity stake. The four largest investment banks in the US corporate bond market, with 
market shares of more than 58 per cent, adopted the technology to launch a radically new business 
model that could potentially render obsolete the dealer's role as an intermediary in the world's 
largest fixed income market. The commitment to a new business model was encapsulated in an 
interview with one of the senior executives: ‘Orchid was going to allow direct trading between 
market participants, in an open platform with live bids and offers.’ Figure 5 provides a summary 
timeline of the launch of the different business models. 
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(Insert Figure 5 about here) 
    The founding dealer banks committed to providing credit support for Orchid, which was to 
serve as the credit intermediary for all trades and to guarantee them. This commitment would 
require approximately 75 per cent less capital compared to the telephone-based business model. 
The dominant banks had set the stage for the total transformation of the fixed income market. 
Orchid was an option to revolutionize the business model of bond trading.  
Therefore, we propose: 
Proposition 2: In network markets, the dominant firms tend to engage in coopetition to innovate 
their business model in a revolutionary manner after the less dominant firms, as an offensive 
strategy to alter radically the existing business model. 
5. Discussion 
Firms who normally compete are increasingly also cooperating among themselves. There 
are many motivations behind these coopetition arrangements of sharing resources (Ritala, 2012). 
First, firms might have a desire to increase the size of the current market or to create totally new 
ones. Second, firms might want to use fewer resources or use the existing resources more 
efficiently. Third, firms might want to protect their existing share of the market and perhaps 
capture a larger share of the remaining market. All of these motivations are aimed at improving 
performance through competitive advantage from existing business or for growth through 
innovation. Extant research has identified some contingency factors that drive firms to engage in 
coopetition. For example, Ritala (2012) shows that network externalities and competitive 
advantage are important contingency factors that could determine innovation and performance of 
the coopetitive entity. Absorptive capacity and appropriability regimes have also been seen to 
influence incremental and radical innovations differently (Ritala & Hurmelinna-Laukkanen, 
27 
 
2013). However, studies have not examined the mechanisms that drive the changing needs for such 
contingency factors and, hence, the interplay of the coevolution of competition and cooperation to 
drive innovation. In this study, we show how one such resource, the installed customer base, might 
change as a result of competition and influence the incentive to engage in coopetition in order to 
innovate business models in network markets. In this context, the installed customer base defines 
the dominance of the firm in the marketplace. 
The literature has made a distinction between incremental and radical innovation based on 
the degree of newness relative to an existing proposition. The degree of newness can be seen from 
an internal, as well as external, perspective (Garcia & Calantone, 2002). An internal perspective 
concerns the firm in terms of technology and other resources and routines, while an external 
perspective concerns the customers and the market. In making a connection between the internal 
and external perspectives, a number of scholars have made a distinction between innovation that 
challenges the technical capabilities of the firm and innovation that challenges the firm’s 
knowledge of the market and customer needs (Abernathy & Clark, 1985; Henderson & Clark, 
1990). However, in network markets, as a result of increasing returns to scale from demand-side 
externalities, the external factor, customers themselves become a key resource for the firm, which 
can shape the incentives for firms to innovate their business model. Moreover, the forces from 
demand-side network externalities could be extremely compelling factors for competitor firms to 
cooperate in order to innovate their business models either to prevent newcomers from succeeding 
or to overturn other incumbent firms. In this paper we study the dynamics of such competition 
between incumbent firms to adopt a coopetition-based strategy to innovate their business models. 
We show how the incentives for coopetition among incumbent firms changes as the 
competition for market share changes over time. This in turn influences how firms with different 
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levels of dominance affect the type of business model innovation adopted. In particular, our 
research shows that, in network markets, when firms choose to engage in coopetition in light of 
competitive threat it is done so in order to adopt a defensive or offensive strategy. We show that 
in network markets the less dominant firms tend to engage in coopetition to innovate their business 
model in an evolutionary manner before the dominant firms, as a defensive strategy to protect their 
existing business model. On the other hand, in network markets, the dominant firms tend to engage 
in coopetition to innovate their business model in a revolutionary manner after the less dominant 
firms, as an offensive strategy to alter radically the existing business model.  
5.1. Managerial Implications 
There are several managerial implications of our study. First, this paper suggests the 
importance for dominant firms to understand resource movements, such as installed customer base, 
as an input into coopetition and business model innovation decisions in network markets. The 
lesson for dominant incumbents in network markets is not to be complacent about the initially slow 
customer attrition rate following the emergence of new propositions. Often the rate of customer 
attrition could accelerate resulting in rapid loss in installed customer base. Therefore, dominant 
incumbents can quickly move from a position of making large profits to one of making large losses. 
This calls for vigilance among dominant incumbents in being able to form coopetition 
arrangements rapidly with competitors in order to be on the offensive to be able to implement 
revolutionary business models that would change the game and maintain leadership in the industry.  
Second, for less dominant incumbents, this research shows that it is vitally important to 
remain strategically flexible. Less dominant incumbents often need to form coopetition 
arrangements in order to innovate their business model earlier as a defensive strategy to maintain 
market share; the empirical case shows that they are more likely to implement an evolutionary 
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business model to do so. However, our case study shows that dominant incumbents may not fit the 
common stereotype of sluggish and hidebound players. Indeed, dominant incumbents, by forming 
a coopetition-based consortium, can implement revolutionary business models with surprising 
alacrity and resolve. The less dominant incumbents must therefore be vigilant about the actions of 
dominant firms, especially since they have a smaller installed base of customers than their 
dominant counterparts, and are therefore less able to influence the outcome of new business 
models. 
Third, our study shows when firms might need to adopt a coopetition strategy. Our results 
has implications for coopetition based strategy in order to defend market shares as opposed to grow 
market shares and how such motivations might change over time for different incumbent firms 
depending on their respective levels of dominance.  
5.2. Theoretical Implications  
There are several theoretical implications of our study. First, we introduce the concept of 
customer adoption dynamics in a competitive setting and how that influences the incentive for 
dominant and less dominant firms to engage in coopetition in order to innovate their business 
models. By doing so, we show that some firms cooperate and compete in order to adopt 
evolutionary or revolutionary business model innovations; we provide a more nuanced view of the 
business model innovation behavior of firms based on coopetition. Research that examines only 
one form or the other is likely to draw incomplete or misleading conclusions about how and when 
firms display coopetition to innovate their business models. This paper serves as a call for a more 
comprehensive view of coopetition and business model innovation. 
Moreover, we enhance the understanding of the complex relationship between firm 
dominance and business model innovation. The extant literature has focused on incompetence 
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(Henderson, 1993), resource dependence that results in focusing on current customers at the 
expense of emerging customers (Christensen, 1997), or the amount and type of resources available 
to the firm (Hitt, Hoskinson & Ireland, 1990). We add to this line of reasoning an alternative 
explanation based on customer adoption dynamics. In particular, we explore the implications for 
innovation strategy as a result of the dynamically changing resource base of the firm, namely the 
customer base. Although we consider network markets, our results would hold in markets that 
display an S-shaped (reverse S-shaped) innovation diffusion curve due to internal feedback effects 
from previous to future adopters (dis-adopters) as a result of contagion, social influence and social 
learning (Young, 2009). 
Our results are closely related to the concepts of replacement and efficiency effects in 
industrial economics (Tirole, 1988). The replacement effect is the force that prevents dominant 
firms from innovating as a result of the risk of losing the substantial profits they derive from the 
existing business model, product or service proposition. On the other hand, the efficiency effect 
encourages dominant firms to innovate because they stand to lose more if a competitor firm were 
to innovate first. We show how changes in the relative strength of the replacement and efficiency 
effects for a dominant firm, due to the customer adoption dynamics, initially causes the firm to be 
lethargic; however, when it does innovate its business model it does so in a radical manner through 
coopetition.7  
Our work also has implications for research on business models. In particular, the business 
model has been argued to transcend the boundary of the firm. One element of such transcendence 
of the business model is how it connects to other competing firms in order to adopt a coopetition 
                                                 
7 Our work is also closely related to the concept of judo and sumo strategy (Brandenburger & Nalebuff, 1996). In the 
judo strategy, the less dominant firm uses the strength of the dominant firm to transform it to its weakness. On the 
other hand, when a firm wants to be large it is best to start out large. Therefore, the sumo strategy states that when the 
dominant firm innovates it is best to innovate radically. 
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strategy. Our study shows that such wider conceptualization of the firm includes not just the 
transactions element but also how the firms might innovate their business model. This has 
implications for how coopetition might shape industry structure and business model evolution. 
6. Conclusion 
Interest in coopetition as a way of building competitive advantage has been increasing, but 
the strategic management literature has only recently begun to address more comprehensively how 
cooperation and competition might occur simultaneously. In particular, mechanisms that drive the 
changing needs for resources and, hence, the interplay of the coevolution of competition and 
cooperation, have received little attention. While conclusions drawn from a single case study 
require certain caveats, our research highlights that, in network markets, when firms choose to 
engage in coopetition in light of competitive threat it is done so in order to adopt a defensive or 
offensive strategy. In particular, we show that, in network markets, the less dominant firms tend 
to cooperate to innovate their business model in an evolutionary manner before the dominant firms, 
as a defensive strategy. In contrast, the dominant firms tend to engage in coopetition to innovate 
their business model in a revolutionary manner after the less dominant firms, as an offensive 
strategy. 
There are several possible limitations and extensions of this study to investigate. First, our 
study was done in the financial services industry with strong demand side network effects. An 
extension of the study could examine whether our results hold in other industries where network 
effects are less important. Second, our study focused on customers as the key resource. An 
extension of the study could explore how other resources of the firm, apart from the installed 
customer base, might influence the coopetition decision. Third, out study did not explore to what 
extent the coopetition among the firms arose from planning as opposed to emergence which could 
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be a line of enquiry for future studies. Fourth, our study is based on single case study with its 
attendant limitations. In order to validate the robustness of our results, future studies need to collect 
and test our propositions using large sample empirical data. Finally, our study did not examine the 
behavioral norms of the industry on coopetition changes as a result of the competitive forces and 
this could be further examined in future studies. Acknowledging these limitations, we argue that 
our study provides a useful framework for understanding a mechanism, namely the customer base, 
as a resource that drives firms to engage in coopetition in order to innovate.   
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Figure 1: Data Structure 
 
  
First Order Concepts Second Order Themes Aggregate Dimensions
Resource sharing to stem decline in market share
Pricing competitively 
Keep core proposition the same
Match pricing of new model
Initially slow customer attrition then acceleration
Scale economics in reverse
Alter core proposition significantly but later
Change the metrics of competition
Protect market share
Incremental improvements
Grow market share 
Radical transformation
Evolutionary coopetition-based 
business model innovation by 
less dominant firms first
Revolutionary coopetition-based 
business model innovation by 
dominant firms later
Resource sharing to alter probability of success
Dominate the market by eliminating competition



























Appendix. Selected Evidence. 
Coopetition to protect market share  
The less dominant firms tried to protect their market share following the entrance of RevolTrade. 
 ‘We did not have the market power to stem the losses in market shares as we were too small 
individually. We needed to work with our smaller competitors to gain market power’ (Head 
of e-commerce of a less dominant bank). 
 ‘We were committed to maintaining the existing approach to trading bonds and saw any 
new approaches as a threat that we can collectively protect ourselves from, even though 
we normally compete with each other’ (Strategy Officer of a less dominant bank). 
Incremental improvements 
The less dominant firms tried to improve incrementally the existing business model following the 
entrance of RevolTrade. 
 ‘We did not want to disintermediate the banks as market makers. We just wanted to 
electronify the phone trading process. Although margins had fallen, we felt that vanilla 
products can be traded electronically and hence, more clients can be reached which should 
compensate the margin fall’ (Vice President, Electronic trading architecture strategy of a 
less dominant firm). 
 ‘We did not think that a direct investor to investor trading model would work. Moreover, 
as margins in the market become too thin, the dealers in the market will stop making 
markets and the margins will increase again. Hence we formed a consortium to improve 
the efficiency of existing dealer-based model’ (Chief Marketing Officer of a less dominant 
bank). 
Coopetition to grow market share 
The dominant firms wanted to grow market share considerably following the launch of Begonia, 
the coopetition-based business model, by the less dominant firms. 
 ‘The bank with the largest market share in corporate bond trading approached us to form 
the direct investor to investor business model. We were the second largest player in the 
market and initially felt that we did not want to join forces with our main competitor. 
However, the more we thought about it the more we felt that if we did not join the 
consortium, they would approach the next largest banks and we could be locked out. 
Moreover, the proposition to work together was potentially game changing and could gain 
us a big market share’ (Managing Director of one of the dominant banks). 
 ‘We had large fixed costs from our sheer size. As the volume and price declined in bond 
trading due to competitive forces, our return on the amount of capital invested was looking 
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less attractive. We were not big enough individually to make a difference and hence, we 
needed to persuade each of our large competitors one at a time to cooperate in order to 
jointly transform the business’ (Chief Operating Officer of one of the dominant firms). 
Radical transformation 
The dominant firms tried to alter radically the existing business model following the launch of 
Begonia, the coopetition-based business model, by the less dominant firms. 
 ‘There was increasing volatility in the bond markets needing the dealers to hold more 
equity for trading, but declining margins meant we needed to change the risk return trade-
off for the investor. Therefore, we enabled direct trading between the investors’  (Head of 
Trading at one of the dominant firms). 
 ‘We felt that having the top firms coming together to form a consortium enables us to define 
the future model for the corporate bond trading market by ourselves, which would enable 
us to admit future partners to the consortium on our own terms’ (Technology Officer at 
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